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ABSTRACT
The HBO television program Last Week Tonight with John Oliver is a new and unique
take on the typical political comedy show popularized by programs like The Daily Show and The
Colbert Report. Uninterrupted by commercial breaks and with full creative control, host John
Oliver and his team spend 30 minutes on Sunday nights discussing a typically underreported
story at length, abandoning the monologue and interview portions reminiscent of traditional
political comedy shows in favor of a long-form style investigation into a particular issue or topic.
The main segment of each episode is then uploaded to the social media website, YouTube,
within 24 hours of the show’s airing for free viewing by anyone with an Internet connection. As
a result, the show has garnered both critical acclaim and an active fanbase of millions who
view, share, and interact with the show by responding to numerous calls to action that usually
follow each segment.
This study seeks to analyze the show’s potential effects on news production, specifically
within the context of intermedia agenda setting, the ability for the show’s content to lead news
outlets to cover the topics discussed during each episode in the time following the episode’s
airing. Through keyword searches, counts of news coverage on online news entities in periods
both before and after the show’s air date were collected in an effort to determine if there are
more articles in the days following a Last Week Tonight episode than in the days preceding one.
Paired sample t-tests were used as the primary method of statistical analysis to compare the
means of each set of counts. Results indicate at least a moderate effect of the show on levels of
news coverage across 25 different episodes for both traditional and native online news entities.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite its relatively recent debut in 2014, the late-night political comedy program Last
Week Tonight with John Oliver has quickly gathered both viewership and critical acclaim. The
television program, which airs on HBO once weekly on Sunday nights, is novel, relevant,
accessible and primarily political, a program many consider an improvement of the political
comedy model made famous by The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Helmore 2014; Kenny 2014;
Zoller Seitz 2014). Just five months into the show’s airing, Last Week Tonight averaged 4.1
million weekly viewers across TV airings/DVR, on-demand and HBOGo (HBO’s online
application) playing, “narrowly ahead of Real Time with Bill Maher’s 4 million weekly viewers,
according to HBO” (O’Connell 2014).
One compelling aspect of Last Week Tonight’s success is its social media presence,
namely on YouTube, which offers premium content to audiences at no cost. The show’s main
segment is posted in full on social media after every episode, dramatically increasing viewership
and reaction online. Reactions to the segments have raked in millions of views within a week,
sometimes even 24 hours of premiering on TV (Helmore 2014; O’Connell 2014). Each weekly
topic is selected in response to a recent lead-in story (the recap) that allows Oliver, the host and
show’s executive producer, to cite a current event or recent news event as the segment’s tie-in.
Oliver then can comment on it at length (the rant), proceeding to deeper issues and
complexities associated with the major topic, largely relying on research conducted by the
show’s staff. The segments typically last around 15 minutes of uninterrupted air time and ends
with a call to action (the crescendo), sometimes in the form of a video or celebrity cameo to
help support their cause or issue (Helmore 2014; Kenny 2014).
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The format of the show, which airs weekly for 30 commercial-free minutes, has led to a
restructuring of the traditional 22-minute broadcast model (Kenny 2014). The extra eight
minutes per show do make a difference, allowing Oliver to devote more time to relevant topics
and separate the show from the Comedy Central format now typical of political comedy
programming (Kenny 2014). The fact that the show only airs once per week has led the writers
and producers to feature stories that have received minimal coverage in efforts to present a
product relevant to late night TV (Kenny 2014; Sneed 2014). Tim Carvell, Last Week Tonight’s
executive producer, notes that writers and staff work through the weekend for a Sunday
evening in-studio recording in an effort to ensure the material hasn’t been already highly
covered by other outlets:
We have some stuff that we know is going to be on the calendar that we’re already
going to be prepping jokes for and bits for, but generally I think we’re going to let the
news of the week determine what we do so it doesn’t feel like three-week-old news,
which is a little bit of a challenge (Sneed 2014).
Episodes so far have focused on a wide variety of domestic and international topics,
such as net neutrality, student debt, special immigrant visas, voting rights in the U.S. territories,
and transgender rights. Segments have on more than one occasion directed attention toward
corporate America, exposing corporate behavior and injustices in the food labeling,
pharmaceutical marketing, big tobacco, standardized testing, and the chicken industries.
Through its efforts to expose injustices and incite action, Last Week Tonight’s segments
are receiving attention from both the viewing public and the news media. Especially compelling
to the show’s study is the perceived real-life effect triggered by the rants and following calls to
actions on subjects that would receive little media coverage otherwise. Oliver’s use of the show
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as his mouthpiece, which Time aptly named the, “John Oliver Effect,” has garnered both a
considerable sphere of influence and attention (Fitz-Gerald 2015; Luckerson 2015).
The John Oliver effect was on full display when the show investigated the Miss America
Pageant and the organization’s claim that the pageant is the largest provider of scholarships for
women in the United States. The pageant stated that it gave $45 million in scholarships, and
although Oliver found that figure to be far from the actual mark, the amount was still more
than any other women-only scholarship the show could find. Oliver made a specific note during
the segment to reference other organizations that offered women-only scholarships and
encourage viewers to donate to change that fact, and one of those organizations (the Society of
Women Engineers) said that in just two days following the episode’s airing, it had received
upwards of $25,000, roughly 15% of what it receives annually in donations (Gregory 2014;
Kowitt 2015; Luckerson 2015).
Perhaps the most infamous example of the “Oliver effect” came in response to the
show’s viral segment on changing the net neutrality laws, a policy change lobbied by cable and
phone companies that would separate web traffic into “lanes” that would allow certain types of
Internet activity to supersede other, less-important traffic. Not only did Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) officials watch and laugh at the episode as it aired, the FCC voted to adopt
net neutrality regulations after Oliver called on his viewers to write to the commission to voice
their opposition to any changes to a free and open Internet (Brody 2015). “Seize your moment,
my lovely trolls,” Oliver said during the segment. “Turn on caps lock, and fly, my pretties!” Seize
the moment they did, when by Monday the FCC’s comment section crashed after over 45,000
comments which many, including Oliver himself, attribute to the show’s segment (Andrews
3

2014; Brody 2015; McDonald 2014; Oliver 2014). Washington Post columnist Soraya Nadia
McDonald observed:
He may be just the firebrand activist we’re looking for — because Oliver’s rant and
subsequent call to action may have crashed the FCC’s Web site, or at the very least slowed it to
a crawl. Oliver encouraged people to comment on the FCC’s site while it decides what to do
about net neutrality (McDonald 2014).
Recent events show that John Oliver’s influence even extends beyond the work of his
engaged viewers. The show’s segment on American Territories served as the reference point for
a 9th circuit court judge in a case regarding Guam’s tax code (Fitz-Gerald 2015; Rhodan 2015).
And the net neutrality case influenced as far as Washington state, where a state senator
credited the segment as the basis for a bill introduced in the Washington legislature allowing
individuals across Washington to submit testimony for legislators in Olympia to watch and
respond to (Brownstone 2015). In large part due to the idea that Oliver can make a real-world
impact, Fortune magazine ranked the host 10th of the 40 Under 40 most influential young
people in business (Kowitt 2015).
While we can see anecdotal evidence of a John Oliver effect in regards to inciting
viewers to take action in response to Oliver’s ranting and calls to action, perhaps the more
important question for scholars deals with a potential effect the show’s reporting of topics can
have on the production of the news in the days following a Last Week Tonight segment. Do
news outlets cover the topics that John Oliver discusses in the days following an episode? What
type of news outlets cover the topics that are discussed on that week’s main segment, and in
what ways? Due to the ability for segments of the show to be shared and viewed online, are
news outlets that exist solely as online news websites (defined as native online news sources)
more likely to cover Last Week Tonight and the segments they produce? This study aims to
4

assess the overall ability of John Oliver and Last Week Tonight to set the news media’s agenda
through selection and reporting of an underreported issue, subject, or topic each week. This
phenomenon is defined as intermedia agenda setting, in which published media content
influences the type and content of other media—in this case, coverage of a popular political
comedy late-night television show by mainstream print, television, and online media. I intend
to explore these questions regarding Last Week Tonight’s effect through an analysis of the
volume and source of online news coverage both before and after each episode date for a
selection of the show’s segments.

5

LITERATURE REVIEW
Influences of Political Comedy Programming
A political comedy show is commonly defined as a television program that covers
current issues using humor to make parodies or jokes about public and political figures (Cao &
Brewer 2008). In the realm of late night television, parody and satire have expanded
significantly into news coverage (Duffy 2013). Political comedy programs, while making fun of
the politicians, public figures and events that comprise the political world, offer critiques of
mainstream news programming as a more entertaining alternative in regards to keeping up
with current events and political news (Duffy 2013). Although the programs are often dismissed
as “fake” news, political comedy shows give viewers a different way of interacting with content
by abandoning the constraints and norms of traditional newsrooms (Baym 2005). The creators
and representatives of political comedy shows actively distance their enterprises from being
labeled a news product, instead claiming that the purpose of the show is for comedic and
satirical purposes only. Popular show hosts and personalities generally identify purely as
entertainers or comedians and not journalists (Baym 2005). Governed by new technological and
economic forces, political comedy shows operate in what Baym calls, “a landscape in which
‘real’ news is becoming increasingly harder to identify and define” (2005; p. 259). Viewers do
not distinguish between journalism and pop culture, resulting in a more integrated media
environment that ranges from political satire and entertainment to actual issue involvement
and participation (Baym 2005; Duffy 2013).
Political comedy programming commonly seeks to uncover failures of mass media as
well as government officials and leaders (Baym 2005). The success of these programs rely on
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pop culture references, quick-witted comebacks, and mockery to captivate and entertain their
audiences while also allowing for some political discourse to occur (Landreville et al. 2010;
Stroud 2007). Research has shown that people watch the shows primarily to be entertained and
that the shows are produced in an effort to generate laughs more than an understanding of the
political world (Prior 2003; Baum 2003; 2005; Baym 2005; Cao & Brewer 2008). However,
political comedy shows can have a positive impact on the public’s knowledge of and participate
in the political world (Cao & Brewer 2008; Landreville et al. 2010).
Communication research of political comedy programs typically concerns one of two
major areas of study: features of political comedy programming and the resulting effects
(Becker & Waisanen 2013). Political comedy programs have proven to be effective in taking
complex political issues and simplifying them, thereby improving a viewer’s understanding,
which increases measures of political engagement and participation (Baumgartner and Morris
2009; Baym and Shah 2011; Cao 2008; Cao & Brewer 2008). One of the most actively
researched effects of political comedy viewing is the impact it can have on political learning
(Warner, Hawthorne, & Hawthorne 2015). Baum (2005) notes that soft news programs like
political comedy shows “piggyback” political information on top of the entertainment functions
they provide. Therefore, exposure to soft news programs is shown to make viewers more
aware of political issues and lead to more political engagement (Baum 2003; Baum 2005; Young
& Tisinger 2006; Dalton 2008). Another way viewers may learn from the shows is through a
gateway effect, in which viewers become more likely to interact with traditional news coverage
as a result of viewing the comedy programs because some political knowledge is necessary to
‘get the joke’ and appreciate the humorous elements of the shows (Cao 2008; Feldman &
7

Young 2008; Xenos & Becker 2009). It is primarily talk shows and late-night comedy programs
that serve as bridges to traditional television news, especially during presidential campaigns, a
prominent source of material for late-night comedians (Feldman & Young 2008; Niven &
Amundson 2003). Aside from the gateway effect, viewers of political comedy may learn directly
about politics and current affairs through the content featured in the programs (Warner,
Hawthorne & Hawthorne 2015). However, some researchers believe that more understanding
is necessary about the proliferation and diffusion of political comedy in today’s media
landscape. The advent of social media websites like YouTube allows the, “increasingly viral
reach of both user-generated and professional produced online political comedy content”
(Becker & Waisanen 2013; p. 174, Becker, Xenos & Waisanen 2010). Baym & Shah (2011) show
that political comedy programming seems to be converging with Internet-based activist
networks, which are re-appropriating clips of show segments using information communication
technologies made possible by the advent of social media. These data suggest that the network
infrastructure already exists for shows like Last Week Tonight to produce and distribute online
media content that has the capacity to go viral and affect not only levels of political
engagement and involvement, but the greater media landscape as well (Becker, Xenos &
Waisanen 2010).
Agenda-Setting Theory
Agenda-setting theory describes a process through which the mass media communicate
to the viewing public which issues and topics are important (McCombs & Shaw 1972). The
theory operates upon the assumption that the media does not tell people what exactly to think,
but rather a specific issue, candidate, or event to think about. Agenda-setting research most
8

typically focuses on the relationships between daily newspapers and the media at-large
(McCombs & Shaw, 1977). Agenda-setting theory begins when the press (or news media)
selects a number of issues, topics, or events to report on and discuss as “the news.” Given the
constraints of time and space for any given news product, some stories and issues are judged to
be more “newsworthy” than others and thus receive more coverage. These newsmaking
decisions, specifically the selection of stories and their assigned value in regards to position in
the news broadcast or item or the amount of space or time spent and depth of coverage,
comprise the elements of the media’s agenda. As viewers consume news, their perceptions and
thoughts are undoubtedly molded and shaped by the structural elements of the media’s
agenda, the important and prevalent issues and topics garnering the most thorough and
consistent coverage. There are three primary factors that determine the influence of agendasetting effects: the level of interest in content (and relevance to the receiver), the degree of
uncertainty about the issue, and the amount of effort required to locate reliable information
(McCombs 2004). The combination of the individual’s level of interest and degree of
uncertainty regarding content is defined as an individual’s need for orientation. The greater the
need for orientation, the more likely one is to subscribe and attend to the agenda of the mass
media (McCombs 2004, p. 66). In a study of candidate images in regional and municipal
elections in Spain, McCombs et al. (1997) introduce an additional unit of analysis to the study of
agenda-setting effects, second-level agenda setting. This concept builds upon the original
theory of agenda setting to show that the second level of analysis are the attributes of each
object, the characteristics and properties that “paint the picture” beyond simply a public issue
and describe how news frames can impact the public agenda (McCombs et al. 1997). At the
9

object level, agenda-setting theory tells us “what to think about” – at the attribute level, media
can also tell us “how to think about” particular objects (McCombs 2005:546; Baran & Davis
2015:266).
Iyengar and Kinder’s (1987) seminal work, News That Matters, demonstrated causality
within the agenda-setting process through a series of controlled experiments. Iyengar and
Kinder (1987) concluded that, “Americans view of their society and nation are powerfully
shaped by the stories that appear on the evening news,” explaining that “people who were
shown network broadcasts edited to draw attention to a particular problem assigned greater
importance to that problem – greater importance than they themselves did before the
experiment began, and greater importance than did people assigned to control conditions that
emphasized different problems” (p. 112). In other words, agenda setting allows media outlets
to dictate what becomes more or less important in the national conversation.
More recently, media scholars have spent more time investigation the agenda-setting
effects media can have on one another (Sweetser, Golan, & Wanta 2008). Intermedia agenda
setting refers to occurrences of one media outlet’s agenda being determined by another media
outlet (Sweetser, Golan, & Wanta 2008). Others define it as the mechanism which creates a
common definition of what is news and what is not (Vliegenthart & Walgrave 2008). Given the
competitiveness with which media operates, scholars believe that outlets will observe and
emulate a competitors’ behavior as soon as it’s made clear that doing so would be
advantageous (Vliegenthart & Walgrave 2008).
Gilbert et al. (1980) argue the New York Times is a distinguished leader in intermedia
agenda setting, as the news outlet indicates what important news and issues that other news
10

outlets should cover. Scholars have also found that newspapers and television networks can
have intermedia agenda-setting influences on one another, which demonstrates that
intermedia agenda setting can occur both within and between media (Reese & Danielian, 1989;
Sweetser, Golan, & Wanta 2008). Golan (2006) showed that the Times had a strong intermedia
agenda-setting effect with the international news agenda of three leading television newscasts.
Intermedia agenda setting also is deeply rooted in studies of campaign agendas and their ability
to permeate newspaper and broadcast media (Conway, Kenski & Wang 2015).
Agenda Setting and the Digital World
As traditional media entities face widespread changes in both the economics of news
production and distribution, traditional media continues to lose ground to a cheaper and more
robust online media. Most print and broadcast media entities have adapted with additional
online components while adopting blogging and other social media forms in an effort to draw
active web publics into news sites (Meraz 2011). Due to these changes, a need exists to reevaluate the agenda-setting influence of news media as a result of a new communication
landscape (Bennett & Iyengar, 2009; Conway, Kenski & Wang 2015; McCombs, 2004).
Scholars frequently question whether or not online media like blogs, online activist
groups, and online news outlets can set the agenda of traditional media, partisan media, or
even political campaigns’ agendas (Conway, Kenski & Wang 2015; Meraz 2011; Heim 2013;
Ragas & Kiousis 2010; Sweetser, Gloan, & Wanta 2008). Recent studies that examine the ability
of new media to affect agenda setting tend to apply the intermedia agenda setting framework
to understand these relationships (Conway, Kenski & Wang 2015).
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In today’s media environment, intermedia agenda setting occurs among media entities
competing in the online news market, even applying to foreign online media in addition to the
American media markets (Jeongsub 2011). Sweetser, Golan, & Wanta (2008) provide support
for the idea that online media like blogs can influence the issue and news agendas of major
television networks within the context of a Presidential election season. National newspapers
rely on social media platforms for reporting, but can also influence candidates and political
parties on social media sites such as Twitter, exhibiting a symbiotic relationship between old
and new media (Conway, Kenski & Wang 2015). And a 2008 study showed that YouTube played
an increasingly large role in the creation and distribution of election media, providing political
content like speeches and advertisements at no-cost to viewers or traditional media outlets to
cover in their own broadcasts (Gueorguieva 2008). Neuman et al. (2014) demonstrated how the
relationship between traditional and social media is also reciprocal, with social media having at
least some influence on news production and vice versa. Further, the study finds that social
media communicated a distinct agenda compared to traditional media and that social media
activity proved to be a better predictor of traditional media than the inverse (Conway, Kenski &
Wang 2015; Neuman et al. 2014). The ability for “trending” topics and stories on social media
websites signal a clear role that can influence the news media’s agenda (Conway, Kenski &
Wang 2015).
An Era of Minimal Effects?
Agenda-setting theory is recognized in the field of political communication as one of the
most important media effects theories of the 20th century. Some scholars argue that agendasetting theory, along with other theories of the time, have been large contributors in shifting
12

the media effects paradigm away from one that assumes media has only a minimal effect
(McCombs 2004; Shehata & Stromback 2013). However, some argue that today’s new media
environment is no longer conducive to the influence of media effects like agenda setting within
the study of political communication. Led by Bennett and Iyengar (2008), a group of prominent
scholars make the argument that changes to the media environment signal that we might be
entering, “a new era of minimal effects,” rendering agenda-setting theory more or less inapt as
a media effects theory (Bennett & Iyengar 2008; p. 709; Shehata & Stromback 2013). As
individuals continue to “detach” from a largely group-based society, they are faced with an
increasing number of media to consume and interact with (Bennett & Iyengar 2008; Arceneaux
& Johnson 2013). But despite the increase of political information made available through
access to television news and online information, studies show that measures of political
knowledge and turnout have not changed (Prior 2005; Bennett & Iyengar 2008).
As active participants in the media landscape, individuals make choices as to which
media they choose to watch and consume, which can alter the extent to which media can
influence them and in what ways (Arceneaux & Johnson 2013; Jerit & Barabas 2012; Prior
2005). Prior (2005) believes the gap in political knowledge and turnout created by the digital
divide is shrinking and will be soon replaced by what he calls a performance-based gap – one
that results in individuals choosing to, “abandon the news for entertainment simply because
they like it better” (p. 578). This concept of selective exposure also contributes to the rise of
political polarization along partisan lines and results in an increasingly narrowed media
environment for individuals to receive information that only reinforces and strengthens an
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individual’s existing beliefs and worldview (Arceneaux & Johnson 2013; Stroud 2010). All of
these trends, the scholars argue, result in a dilution of and challenge to media effects.
Despite these changes, others believe that media effects are not only plausible, but
increasingly probable in the field of political communication. Holbert, Garnett, & Gleason
(2010) offer a critique of Bennett and Iyengar’s approach to the question of minimal effects,
stating that the idea of persuasive effects, which they believe is equated to attitude change, has
neglected other factors like the formation or reinforcement of attitudes. Instead, they argue
that a broader view of persuasion is required when analyzing the minimal effects arguments
and assessing the conclusions reached about the future of media effects research (Holbert,
Garnett, & Gleason 2010). Another major critique of Bennett and Iyengar’s argument is that the
scholars exclude the influence of new technologies that may serve to facilitate political
discussion like social media platforms (Holbert, Garnett, & Gleason 2010).
Central to both the debate surrounding media effects as well as this study is the concept
of the inadvertent news audience. In a media landscape dominated by a bevy of choices and
enticing entertainment options, scholars debate the capacity for news consumption and
political learning to occur when individuals are seemingly less interested in politics and
wouldn’t have consumed news in the first place if given more options. The argument put forth
by Holbert, Garnett & Gleason (2010) is yet again that the conceptualization of news
consumption is too narrow. As we have noted previously, the fields of news media and
entertainment are becoming increasingly blended. If media influence on politics go beyond the
confines of a traditional news program, then more choice may not necessarily result in minimal
effects. The genre of soft news allows audiences to come into contact with a wide range of
14

political topics in a variety of programming from animated comedies, to sitcoms, to late-night
television. Indeed, Baym (2005) notes that political comedy programming operates upon the
premise that viewers arrive for the entertainment and comedic value of the program but may
also unintentionally learn from the political content discussed and featured on the shows, as
well as to seek further clarification in some cases to understand the jokes themselves. This
suggests that non-news outlets can generate a variety of unintended outcomes in regards to
media effects (Baym 2005; Holbert, Garnett & Gleason 2010).
Last Week Tonight, Intermedia Agenda Setting, and Political Activism
As noted previously, the HBO show Last Week Tonight with John Oliver represents a
significant deviation from the traditional political comedy model due to its structure and
content choices (Kenny 2014; Zoller Seitz 2014). Some believe that the show improves upon the
previous format offered by shows like The Daily Show and The Colbert Report (Kenny 2014).
Indeed, the ability to produce the show on a premium, subscription-based network in HBO
allows for creative control, the use of uncensored and sometimes explicit language, and a
commercial-free time slot gives Last Week Tonight a distinct advantage over both its
predecessors as well as its competitors (Zoller Seitz 2014). But perhaps what may separate it
most from other political comedy programming is the attention to practicing what Vulture
columnist Matt Zoller Seitz calls, “real journalism in comedy form” (Zoller Seitz 2014). Unlike
the traditional structure of shows like The Daily and Nightly Shows, which consist of a
monologue, taped segment, and interview or panel discussion, Last Week Tonight approaches
political content with a clear reporting angle, intended to inform as much as it is to entertain
(Kenny 2014). Further, the show’s ability to expound on what are typically complex and
15

multifaceted issues separate it from others who are limited by segment length and commercial
breaks to tackle issues in greater detail (Kenny 2014). These changes are notable and result in a
different relationship with the audience of the show, which Kenny (2014) notes, “anticipates
Oliver’s extended commentary for a week,” wondering what he will rant about and how he will
engage them to learn about an under-reported problem or issue. When placed into the context
of a media effects conversation, this show offers the ability to both entertain (allowing those
turned off by the news to laugh and escape traditional news content) and educate the audience
through a nuanced and detailed account of an unknown or typically unpopular political issue or
topic. Both facets of the show make the show’s segments incredibly compelling to audiences,
leading other media outlets to share the material with their followers for either the
entertainment value of the jokes or to spread awareness of the issue, or both.
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of Last Week Tonight’s version of political comedy
is Oliver’s willingness to take substantive action upon the issues and systems he seeks to
challenge. Donnagal Young, one of the most prominent scholars in the field of political satire,
noted in an interview with The Guardian, “He's offering an explicit call to action that's unique.
He's interacting with a topic, not just commenting or issuing a broad judgment” (Helmore
2014). In regards to the reaction to the net neutrality segment discussed earlier, Oliver told CBS
host Charlie Rose in an interview, "We didn't crash their website, Charlie – that's a huge
accusation. We merely pointed people to their website and told them why they should be angry
about it, and they went in droves” (Helmore 2014). Oliver’s call to action signifies a marked
departure from the old political comedy model and speaks to the show’s viral potential – as
noted previously, each of the main segments are uploaded to YouTube within 24 hours after
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the broadcast date, allowing both timeliness and reach to an army of followers and viewers
that spread the message and many times, follow Oliver’s calls to incite change (Kenny 2014).
Ragas and Kiousis (2010) found that during the 2008 Presidential election that activist
communication efforts and consumer-generated content were able to find significant levels of
agenda setting between activist networks, online media, and political campaigns.
If Last Week Tonight’s segments themselves are not picked up by other media, the
resulting events of the call to action provide another opportunity to share the show’s content
and cover the topics discussed. Jeongsub’s (2011) model for understanding intermedia
responses to a competitor’s breaking stories predicts three possible responses to published
content mediated by the content’s salience and newsworthiness: to ignore, follow, or upgrade
the story with new content. With Last Week Tonight’s content consistently viral, traditional and
online news outlets may opt to reference, piggyback, or share the show’s content in efforts for
page clicks and higher readership. Based on the research surrounding agenda setting,
intermedia agenda setting, and the potential influence of political comedy programs, the
following hypothesis and research questions are proposed:
H1: There will be a greater amount of news coverage on Last Week Tonight’s main topic in the
days following the episode air date than coverage of that topic prior to the episode date.
RQ1a: Native online news entities will have a greater amount of new coverage on Last Week
Tonight’s main topic in the days after the show’s episode date than prior to the episode date
when compared with traditional media outlets.
RQ1b: There will be greater amount of coverage on John Oliver or Last Week Tonight on native
online news entities when compared with traditional media outlets.
17

METHOD
To measure the total volume of news coverage of each specific topic or issue, this study
examines levels of news coverage both before and after Oliver’s telecast. If the media devotes
greater coverage to the issues or topics Oliver features in the show in the days after airing, then
agenda-setting effects would be plausible. As discussed in the literature, the show’s producers
take care to ensure little to no media coverage of the issue prior to the show’s airing, which
should limit the levels of media coverage during our search period. This research utilizes
keyword searches of the issues or topics associated with Last Week Tonight’s main segments in
an effort to assess the volume and type of news coverage by a variety of online media outlets.
Keywords in the study for each main segment topic were retrieved directly from the show’s
official YouTube account, in which each clip uploaded is titled with a one-word title or short
phrase to describe what the segment is about. In the event that the keyword is more than one
word, quotations will be used to ensure that the words are searched as a single phrase.
Procedures
Using each segment’s keywords, a series of searches was performed to measure the
amount of news coverage each topic or issue received. In cases when the headline or
description under the headline did not bear resemblance to the keyword or segment, the result
was not counted and skipped. Searches were conducted both three (pre-count) and seven
(extended pre-count) days prior to the episode air date and after each episode air date (the
post-count and extended post-count). By expanding the searches to both three and seven days
before and after the episode date, we can discover if the depth and consistency of coverage
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after the episode date can be attributed to the show’s influence. The pre-count period is
defined as the Friday, Saturday and Sunday before the episode airs Sunday night. The postcount period is defined as the Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday after the air date. The
extended pre-count period is defined as 7 days before the air date until the day the segment
airs. The extended post-count period is defined as the Monday after the segment airs until 7
days after the air date. To further find evidence of news coverage that can be attributed to the
show’s influence, both the show’s host (John Oliver) and the show’s title (Last Week Tonight)
were added as additional keywords in two extra post-count searches. Therefore, for each topic,
a total of six counts are collected: 3 and 7 days before the episode date, 3 and 7 days after the
episode date, and 3 and 7 days after the episode date with additional keywords. In total, only
articles published between April 27, 2014, the date of the show’s premiere, and November 22,
2015—the date the second season ended—are eligible to be included in the counts.
Sample
In total, the show produced 61 segments in the show’s first two seasons. There are 26
topics that were prominently featured in the show’s first season, which aired from April 27,
2014 to November 9, 2014. In two episodes (Episodes 1 and 9), multiple topics were discussed
prominently. The second season consisted of 34 weekly episodes beginning on February 8 th,
2015, and continuing weekly through November 22, 2015. Every episode but one (Season 2
Episode 8 on government surveillance aired for 45 minutes due to an interview with Edward
Snowden) aired for approximately 30 minutes. For all but the first episode, video clips of the
segments were posted on YouTube for full and open access by the public.
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Due to the volume of episodes within the first two seasons, totaling 61 segments, it was
necessary to reduce the overall size of the sample. Additionally, previous analysis suggests that
each individual segment may not have significant agenda-setting effects (see Appendix A). This
study narrows the sample to assess coverage of the most popular segments as defined by a
popularity metric that combines the amount of views, likes, shares, subscriptions driven, likes,
and dislikes as collected from each video’s statistics that YouTube collects and publishes on
each video’s page. Every segment produced in the first 2 seasons of Last Week Tonight was
scored on each statistic and Top 10 Lists were compiled based on each stat, with 1 point given
for an appearance on each Top 10 list and a maximum score of 5. For the purposes of this
study, every segment that had a score of 2 or above, 13 episodes in total, was included in the
study (see Appendix B for detailed scoring information). As a control, the least popular
segments by the same metrics (reverse scored) were also included in efforts to discern if
noticeable contrast exists between popular and unpopular segments. The reverse scored
segments featured 12 segments which -2 or more and comprised the sample. This results in a
total of 25 of Last Week Tonight’s main segments chosen for analysis.
Keyword searches will be conducted on the web pages of online news outlets as defined
by Pew’s Top 50 Online News Entities (see Appendix C). The Pew (2015) rankings list online
news entities by both the total number of unique visitors and average minutes spent on their
websites per visit for the month of January 2015. The outlets were chosen from a mix of native
online news entities and traditional news entities. Half of the 20 outlets chosen for the sample
comprised of the 10 native online news sources featured on the Pew (2015) list. The other 10
sources were chosen via a random sample of the remaining 40 sources on the list. Most of the
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online news outlet’s webpages have a search function that can be used to perform keyword
searches of the issues and topics discussed in each major segment of the show. Those without a
search function were eliminated from the sample. After pre-testing, 7 of the 20 news sources
were eliminated from the sample due to either the lack of a search function, the inability to sort
results by date, or an inconsistency of search results. Due to these challenges, The New York
Times was randomly selected1 and added to the sample as another traditional news entity,
totaling 14 news outlets, 10 traditional online news entities and 4 native online news outlets
(see Appendix D).
Measurement and Variables
The sampling frame is each segment of the show included in the sample, defined the
Season and Episode Number (V1 and V2 respectively). The primary unit of analysis for this study
is the segment, defined through the use of the segment’s keyword as the search term. For postcount searches, the unit of analysis is expanded to include the show and host as additional
keywords. An additional sampling frame will be articles collected from the searches of
randomly selected online news entities. The determination of the sample size is determined by
the most and least popular segments as measured by amounts of views, likes, shares,
subscriptions driven, likes, and dislikes of each clip. Incidentally, the show also serves as the
unit of data collection. The unit of data collection or information source are the show’s weekly
segments, as viewed and measured through YouTube for all segments included in the sample.

1

The New York Daily News was the next randomly selected news outlet, but its sample posed
similar issues. Therefore, the Times was the next randomly selected news outlet, and because
there were no sampling obstacles, it was the outlet selected for the study.
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The independent variables of the study are the weekly segments of the show and online news
outlets as defined by Pew (2015). The dependent variable is the levels of news coverage as
counted before and after each episode date. Because my sample is comprised of solely ratio
measures, I intend to employ a difference of means through a series of paired sample t-tests for
both pre- and post-count results and between news outlets and dates. Please see Appendix E
for a list of variables, operational definitions, sources, statistics, and data.
Intercoder Reliability
To ensure intercoder reliability of the coding of the keyword searches and counts, a
second coder was enlisted to code a test sample comprised of episodes and keywords not
included in the primary sample. The test sample was comprised of two main
segments/keywords, which comprises about 8% of the 25 segment main sample. To ensure
consistency with the sample, the segments were chosen upon a random sample of segments
based upon the same popularity metrics, the popular segment receiving a score of 1 (one
appearance on a Top 10 list), and the unpopular segment receiving a score of -1.
Intercoder reliability was conducted through the use of Recal, a statistical program that
compared the second coder’s sample with the original coder’s coded counts. After both data
sets were collected, the data was analyzed to find Krippendorf’s Alpha levels for each case as
opposed to percent agreement. After pre-testing was complete, the data was analyzed to find
Krippendorf’s Alpha levels for each case as opposed to percent agreement. Alpha levels of .80
and higher (up to 1) are typically regarded as the standard for significant reliability calculation
(De Swert 2012). Figure 1 shows that for pre-count and post-count periods (V7 and V8,
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respectively) the alpha ratio were .861 and .872, suggesting a strong measure of reliability.
Alpha ratio levels for counts of the news articles in the Post- and Extended-Post Count (V9 and
10) periods were even higher at .886 and .88. Lastly, Post-Count measures with the additional
keywords (V11 and V12) had alpha ratios of .814 and .871.
Variable

Cases

Decisions

Krippendorff’s Alpha
(ratio)

Pre-Count Period

32

64

0.861

Extended Pre-Count
Period

32

64

0.872

Post-Count Period

32

64

0.886

Extended Post-Count
Period

32

64

0.88

Post-Count Period
with Additional
Keywords
Extended Post-Count
Period with Additional
Keywords

32

64

0.814

32

64

0.871

Figure 1: Intercoder Reliability Measures
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DATA AND RESULTS
The central aim of this study is to assess potential agenda-setting effects of the HBO
show, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver. Using a sample of online news entities, searches
were conducted to assess the levels of news coverage both before and after the show’s
episodes. Figure 2 presents basic descriptive statistics for the entre dataset. In total, 318 counts
of news coverage were recorded across 14 news outlets and 25 date ranges. The single highest
count was 85 articles in the three days after an episode and 115 in the week following an
episode. The level of news coverage of the issues discussed on Last Week Tonight was far
greater for the post-count (m = 2.75 s = 7.602) and extended post count (m = 4.22, s = 12.354)
timeframes in the days following the episode date than the amount of coverage in similar
timeframes before the episode aired (m = .91 s = 2.494 for the pre-count period, and m= 2.54, s
= 6.579 for the extended pre-count period respectively). In both post-count time frames, the
mean and standard deviation outperformed their counterparts prior to the episode date.

Pre-Count
Post-Count
Extended PreCount
Extended PostCount

Number of Cases
(N)
318
318
318

Mean

Variance

.91
2.75
2.54

Standard
Deviation
2.494
7.602
6.579

318

4.22

12.354

152.625

6.219
57.787
43.284

Figure 2: Descriptive Statistics (Entire Sample)
Although the standard deviation and variance between the pre-and post-count time
frames are pronounced, comparisons of the mean between pre-and post-count measures show
that in each case, there are a higher number of articles after the episode date. Higher standard
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deviations in the post-count periods signal that some episodes received markedly more
coverage than others, specifically in more popular segments according to our popularity metric.

Pre-Count
Post-Count
Extended PreCount
Extended PostCount

Number of Cases
(N)
165
165
165

Mean

Variance

.89
2.25
2.95

Standard
Deviation
2.792
6.083
8.365

165

3.94

12.634

159.618

7.793
37.005
69.973

Figure 3: Descriptive Statistics (Most Popular Segments)
Figures 3 and 4 break down these statistics between the two groups of segments. As we
can see, the variance and standard deviation are smaller in the pre-count periods for the least
popular segments than those in the more popular grouping.

Pre-Count
Post-Count
Extended PreCount
Extended PostCount

Number of Cases
(N)
153
153
153

Mean

Variance

.93
3.28
2.10

Standard
Deviation
2.136
8.946
3.794

153

4.52

14.397

145.909

4.561
80.032
14.397

Figure 4: Descriptive Statistics (Least Popular Segments)
These data suggest that those segments that may be receiving more coverage vary more
frequently by news source. The extended pre-count standard deviation and variance for the
most popular group stand out as unusual, as do the post-count statistics for the least popular
segments. Otherwise, we see a somewhat varied but overall positive relationship between
these time frames.
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The primary statistical method of analysis was the paired sample t-test, which compares
the differences in means between the pre- and post-count date ranges. While other statistical
tests may be perhaps more appropriate, the data presented in Figures 2 through 4 suggest that
the distributions of the dependent variable are typical considering what we expect to find and
therefore allow us to accurately compare the means of the pre- and post-count periods to
assess whether the relationship between the time before and after the episode date is
significant.
Table 1 shows the cumulative t-test result of the entire sample. In sum, we find
statistically significant results in both times of comparison between date ranges, which provides
support for H1. For the 3-day pre-and post-count periods, t(317) = 4.947, p ≤ .05. For the
extended pre-and post-count time frames, which spanned a full week prior and after each
episode, t(317) = 3.136, p ≤ .05. In both timeframes, we are able to reject the null hypothesis.
Table 1: Cumulative Paired Samples T-Test (Entire Sample)
Pairings

Mean

Standard
Deviation

t

df

Sig (2Tailed)

6.608

Std.
Error
Mean
.371

Post-Count and PreCount Periods
Extended PostCount and Extended
Pre-Count Periods

1.833

4.949

317

.000***

1.673

9.514

.534

3.136

317

.002***

*p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001.
In an effort to find the greatest potential agenda-setting effect, the sample was narrowed from
a potential 61 segments down to only 25. The 13 most popular and viral segments were
selected into the sample based from an aggregate popularity metric that ranked the most
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popular segments of the show produced in the first two seasons according to YouTube statistics
like views, likes, and shares. Table 2 shows the cumulative paired sample t-test for the most
popular segments, which produced statistically significant results for coverage of the issues
discussed during the 3-day timeframe, but not the 7-day period. This may be in some part due
to the relevancy of the topics discussed or the relative lack of the coverage in the few days prior
to the episodes airing, even though the extended period was moderate and positive.
Table 2: Cumulative Paired Samples T-Test (Most Popular Segments)
Pairings

Mean

Post-Count and Pre- 1.358
Count Periods
Extended Post.988
Count and Extended
Pre-Count Periods
Post-Count
.055
Additional Keywords

Standard
Deviation

t

df

Sig (2Tailed)

4.041

Std.
Error
Mean
.315

4.315

164

.000***

7.822

.609

1.622

164

.107

.253

.020

2.768

164

.006**

*p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001.
As a control, the least popular segments from the two seasons were also compiled by
the same popularity metric and reverse scored to find the lowest performing segments.
Table 3: Cumulative Paired Samples T-Test (Least Popular Segments)
Pairings

Mean

Post-Count and Pre- 2.346
Count Periods
Extended Post2.412
Count and Extended
Pre-Count Periods
Post-Count
.013
Additional Keywords

Standard
Deviation

t

df

Sig (2Tailed)

8.540

Std.
Error
Mean
.690

3.398

152

.001***

11.032

.892

2.704

152

.008***

.114

.009

1.419

152

.158

*p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001.
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Conversely, Table 3 consists of the cumulative paired sample t-test results for the 12
least popular segments. Surprisingly, both timeframes were statistically significant, suggesting
that the show’s effect could be more consistent than originally imagined. However, one
compelling difference between the most and least popular segments is the amount of coverage
that references either John Oliver or Last Week Tonight. This suggests that the show’s timing of
the episodes in relation to the topics discussed could also have an effect on the levels of news
coverage, especially with consideration to the volume of news coverage just before and after
the episode (sig = .001). Within each grouping of segments, some episodes were markedly
more popular in regards to volume of news coverage across outlets than others. This may be
due to the fact that some episodes, regardless of popularity, were aired prior to an event.
Table 4: Paired Sample T-Tests by Segment
(Most Popular Segments – Post- and Pre-Count Periods)
Segment Title

Mean

Std. Error
Mean

t

df

Sig (2-Tailed)

Government
Surveillance
Net Neutrality
Fifa and the World Cup
Sex Education
Televangelists
Wealth Gap
Miss America Pageant
Migrants and Refugees
Dr. Oz and Nutritional
Supplements
Nuclear Weapons
Tobacco
Online Harassment
Canadian Election

1.308

.382

3.423

12

.005**

1.538
6.600
.571
.643
.143
.786
1.833
.214

.722
4.551
.202
.248
.143
.300
1.107
.155

2.132
1.450
2.828
2.590
1
2.621
1.657
1.385

12
9
13
13
13
13
11
13

.054
.181
.014*
.022*
.336
.021*
.126
.189

1.100
.547
2.012
1.500
.453
3.308
.231
.323
.714
2.643
.599
4.415
*p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001.

9
9
12
13

.075
.009**
.489
.001***
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Table 5: Paired Sample T-Tests by Segment
(Most Popular Segments – Extended Period)
Segment Title

Mean

Std. Error
Mean

t

df

Sig (2Tailed)

Government
Surveillance
Net Neutrality
Fifa and the
World Cup
Sex Education
Televangelists
Wealth Gap
Miss America
Pageant
Migrants and
Refugees
Dr. Oz and
Nutritional
Supplements
Nuclear Weapons
Tobacco
Online
Harassment
Canadian Election

1.538

.538

2.857.

12

.014*

1.846
15.200

.799
7.824

2.309
1.943

12
9

.040*
.084

.286
.714
-.214
-1.571

.425
.266
.261
.754

.672
2.687
-.822
2.085

13
13
13
13

.513
.019*
.426
.057

-4.583

2.789

1.643

11

.129

.214

.155

1.385

13

.189

-.700
.400
.231

1.795
.427
.411

-390
.937
.562

9
9
12

.706
.373
.584

13

.097

2.143

1.199
1.787
*p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001.

Tables 4 shows the paired sample t-test results sorted by individual segments for the
most popular groups between the post- and pre-count periods. Table 5 displays the same
results for the extended post- and pre-count periods. The tables are ordered from most or least
popular in descending order. Statistically significant results for the most and least popular
segments within the groups listed toward the top of the figures suggest that attention and
public reaction, whether it be positive or negative, matters most to the level of news coverage.
While all results were not statistically significant, most show a positive relationship between
the episode date and the level of news coverage for each keyword. However, we also find data
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that is largely insignificant for specific segments that were less likely to receive coverage as a
result of the episode airing, namely segments that either receive coverage elsewhere (like
nuclear weapons and the right to be forgotten) or segments that occurred after a major event
in which the keywords would show up in news coverage like the Miss America pageant, which
had crowned a winner the previous week before the Last Week Tonight airing. In some
instances, it seems as if the complexity or uniqueness of the keyword also had an effect on its
significance, namely the wealth and Medicaid gaps or terms like prisoner re-entry, which can be
referred to in other ways.
Table 6: Paired Samples T-Test by Segment
(Least Popular Segments – Post- and Pre-Count Period)
Segment Title

Mean

Std. Error
Mean

t

df

Sig (2-Tailed)

The Washington
Redskins
Right to be forgotten
Hobby Lobby
Elected Judges
Patents
State Legislatures
The IRS
Medicaid Gap
Prisoner Re-Entry
Pennies
North Dakota
Daily Fantasy Sports

6.273

2.684

2.337

10

.042*

13
13
13
9
11
9
13
13
13
12
12

.174
.057
.435
.343
.063
.111
.671
1.000
.019*
.489
.117

-.357
12.714
.143
4.00
5.667
2.400
.071
.000
.357
.231
.769

.248
-1.439
6.083
2.090
.177
.806
.400
1.000
2.742
2.066
1.360
1.765
.616
.434
.105
.000
.133
2.687
.323
.714
.455
1.761
*p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001.

Table 6 shows to the paired sample t-test results sorted by individual segments for the
least popular groups during the post- and pre-count periods. Table 7 displays the extended preand post-count periods by segment. Taken together, Tables 1-7 provide moderate to high
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statistical support for H1 at multiple levels of specificity in two timeframes, albeit at different
levels of significance. These data suggest some evidence of an intermedia agenda-setting effect
through the levels of news coverage in the days following a Last Week Tonight segment when
compared to baseline levels of coverage prior to the segment.
Table 7: Paired Samples T-Test by Segment (Least Popular Segments – Extended Period)
Segment Title

Mean
Extended

t (Extended)

df (extended)

8.091

Std. Error
Mean
Extended
3.614

2.239

10

Sig (2Tailed)
Extended
.049*

The
Washington
Redskins
Right to be
forgotten
Hobby Lobby
Elected Judges
Patents
State
Legislatures
The IRS
Medicaid Gap
Prisoner ReEntry
Pennies
North Dakota
Daily Fantasy
Sports

-3.143

1.042

-3.015

13

.010**

17.143
.071
-.300
6.083

7.446
.221
.803
3.702

2.302
.322
-.373
1.643

13
13
9
11

.038*
.752
.718
.129

2.500
.071
.000

1.455
.616
.148

1.718
.434
.000

9
13
13

.120
.671
1.000

.357
.308
-1.692

.133
.237
.603

2.687
1.298
-.378

13
12
12

.019*
.219
.016*

*p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001.
Tables 8 and 9 seek to address RQ1a and RQ1b respectively, which concern the
prevalence of news coverage specifically on native online news websites. When comparing
traditional and native online news outlets, we find only modest support for RQ1a, and only
when looking at the differences between the extended pre-and post-count periods. Simply
stated, the df show that there were more than twice as much data collected from traditional
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online news outlets, which may skew the results. The t-tests show statistically significant values
for both the pre-and post-count timeframes among both types of sources, so it is reasonable to
assume that the type of online news source is negligible at best.
Table 8: Paired Samples T-Tests by Type of News Outlet (Traditional vs. Native Online)
Type of
News
Outlet

Mean Mean
Std.
Std.
t
t
df
Extended Error Error
(Extended)
Mean Mean
Extended
Traditional 2.222 2.009
.530 .772
4.194 2.602
215
Online
News
Sources
Native
.980 .930
.265 .304
1.506 1.532
99
Online
News
Sources
*p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001.

df
Sig (2(extended) Tailed)

Sig (2Tailed)
Extended

215

.000*** .010**

99

.000*** .003**

Table 9 compares news coverage that specifically included the additional keywords
pertaining to the HBO show, Last Week Tonight, and its host, John Oliver. RQ1b suggests that
these keywords will find more results on native online news sources than traditional online
news sources, and the results show that to be moderately true, finding moderate positive
relationships between native online news sources and news coverage during the post-count
time periods, especially during the extended post-count period which is statistically significant.
These data suggest that native online news sources may seek to cover the show and John Oliver
moreso than the topics and subjects discussed on the show’s segments, which the news outlets
and articles otherwise may not cover if it weren’t for the comedic and entertainment elements
associated with the political comedy genre.
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Table 9: Paired Samples T-Tests by Type of News Outlet (Additional Keyword Post-Counts)
Pair

Mean

Std. Error t
Mean
.046
1.630

df

.075

Std.
Deviation
.826

317

Sig (2Tailed)
.104

Post-Count
Native Online
Extended PostCount Native
Online

.110

.897

.050

317

.029**

2.188

*p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001.
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DISCUSSION
This study examined the amount of news coverage across 14 news websites both before
and after 25 of the show’s main segments of Last Week Tonight in order to determine if
intermedia agenda-setting effects would be visible. Results indicated that there was some
evidence of intermedia agenda setting, although the level of specificity, namely breaking down
the effects by individual segment, did play a role in the level statistical significance. Both the
most and least popular groupings of segments were statistically significant in both timeframes,
suggesting that regardless of the relative popularity of the clip, the topics and issues discussed
received coverage by the outlets. It must be noted that because the extended pre- and postcount periods are inclusive of the pre- and post-count three-day interval that both measures
would be similarly significant, although large amounts of coverage are in fact possible in the
additional days of the extended time frame. When looking at each individual segment, the
segments with significance were those designated as the most or least popular according to our
popularity metric. This suggests that it may not be simply the amount of likes or dislikes the
segment received, but the overall reaction to the segment writ large. Segments that are divisive
and controversial may elicit coverage just as much as other segments that are popular and wellreceived.
Another major question in this study concerns the influences of native online news
entities, defined as news websites that were founded and exist only online. Comparisons
between traditional and native online news sources reveal only a slight difference in coverage
in the extended post-count period. However, data that specifically looked at the influence of
articles that mentioned either John Oliver or Last Week Tonight show a positive relationship
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between the additional keyword searches and native online news entities, with the extended
post count period showing a statistically significant result. This suggests that the native online
news outlets may be more focused on covering Oliver’s coverage of the event in the days
following the segment, but perhaps are not rushed to share the clips immediately. This may
also be due to the potential viral nature of each segment; as a clip begins to gain traction and
become viewed and shared through the Internet, these outlets may find reason to cover the
segments on account of their viral status more than those outlets would regarding the issues or
topics that the segment concerns.
With the influences of online media and the potential for viral news events to shape the
new media landscape, this research serves as an entry into the discussion of intermedia agenda
setting by a political comedy program. While this study does not help to further our
understanding of how news organizations cover political comedy programming, it does
contribute to the existing literature by approaching the question of agenda-setting effects from
the preview of both volume and source. By testing the timeframes before and after the
episode, this study shows an overall increase in related news that carries some relevance and
significance to the issues and topics discussed on Last Week Tonight. These data also highlight
both similarities and slight differences between traditional and native online news sources in
their coverage of the show. The fact that both traditional and native online news entities would
be similarly likely to cover the segments produced on Last Week Tonight lend credence to the
popular belief that the show’s content is perceived more like real journalism and less like an
entertainment product.
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The longer, commercial-free format of political comedy programming that Last Week
Tonight has created is also compelling to viewers both during the shows airing on HBO each
Sunday night and online, where the clips are posted within 24 hours for anyone to view from
Monday on forward at no cost. The influences of what would otherwise be premium content
only available through a subscription model now made available to the public through YouTube
cannot be understated when discussing the effect both Last Week Tonight and John Oliver can
have on not only the news agenda, but on real-world events. The ease of use of YouTube as a
social media platform certainly contributes to the potential for Last Week Tonight clips to
become viral, but also to be embedded into news articles which make these clips appealing to
news producers.
Within the context of media effects, the results presented in this study do suggest some
effect of the show’s content, specifically when considering the levels of news coverage before
the episode are intended by the show’s producers to be minimal. However, data presented
here suggests that the influences are heavily mediated by the type of content, namely the
issues or topics that each segments covers. It is not surprising to notice that segments for
instance on government surveillance, which featured an exclusive interview with NSA
whistleblower Edward Snowden, would be immensely popular amongst viewers. However,
when comparing the uber-popular segments with less popular segments like those on patents
or prisoner re-entry, we notice a significant drop-off in perceived effects. This aspect requires
both more research and investigation as scholars learn more about intermedia agenda setting
and the potential influences between and amongst media.
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In sum, this study seeks to not only add to the existing literature on both political
comedy and agenda-setting effects, but also to contribute toward uncovering the changes
within these fields as they adapt to the influences of the Internet and the digital age. As more
media content, specifically premium media content, is offered at heavily discounted or free cost
to consumers, the latitude and reach of these media will continue to grow, especially
considering the influence of social media and the potential for viral content. The new media
environment also creates new questions about the mechanics and dynamics of agenda setting,
especially intermedia agenda setting between social and traditional media. Political comedy
programming is undergoing similar changes – the ability for a comedian like John Oliver to sign
a deal with HBO shows that political comedy programming is in high-demand to afford the
show both the structural components and creative freedom necessary to deviate from the
norm of a daily half-hour of cable television into an uninterrupted, commercial-free mass media
product intended for consumption to the masses through the Internet.
Limitations
While the study did find some evidence of an agenda-setting effect, it is important to
discuss the several limitations of this study. Perhaps the largest limitation was the structural
deficiencies of the online news website’s search functions, which can be characterized as
rudimentary at best for most outlets included in the sample. With the exception of The New
York Times and Time, no other outlet included in the sample allowed to narrow the search
returns within a date range. This made coding the data not only more time-consuming, but less
effective and problematic with considerations to the fact that more than a few outlets capped
the amount of search returns they would display at 5 or 10 pages. When looking for news
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coverage now over two years old in some instances, this was not possible and resulted in some
of the sample having a lower n of searches. Additionally, there were even more drastic issues
with considerations to many of the native online news outlets. As you can see in Appendix F, 7
of the 20 online news entities originally constructed sample (5 of which were native online
sources) were not able to be included in the study for various reasons ranging from the
inconsistency of search returns and the inability to sort or narrow by date to the lack of a
search function entirely. This significantly limited the number of searches that could be
performed and analyzed, which results in low statistical power and more varied results.
The significance of the data itself must also be addressed. Although there were
statistically significant results found for the levels of post- and extended post-count coverage
when compared to their comparable timeframes before the episode, there is no way of
controlling completely for the show’s influence. In some cases, specifically the Canadian
election and 2014 FIFA World Cup, the high number of articles in the post-count period could
be explained away due to the timing of the events themselves, which occurred in the time after
the segments aired. Whether this is intentional behavior of the show itself to choose topics that
they know will receive attention in the coming days or not is also unknown. Topics like the
segment on refugees and migrants seemed to completely go against the show’s effects to cover
underreported events, as the refugee crisis in Syria and the resulting effects in Europe and
elsewhere were heavily covered before, throughout, and beyond our timeframes. In other
cases, the level of news coverage varied significantly because of the outlets themselves. For
example, the Washington Post covered their hometown football team, the Washington
Redskins, significantly more than any other news outlet in the sample.
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Another key limitation to the study was evident when conducting the searches for
articles that matched one of the additional keywords, John Oliver or Last Week Tonight. In
many cases, the effects of the show’s calls to action or efforts to engage on a particular
important topic were covered by the news outlets, but after the extended post-count
timeframe of 7 days. This resulted in the coverage left out of the sample and thus does not give
a completely accurate look at how much the outlets do cover the show itself. In some other
searches, evidence of news coverage just before or beyond the date range was also observed,
suggesting that the limits of 3 and 7 days respectively may not have been the most accurate
barometer of news coverage of a given topic. While there will always be some articles that
cannot be included in the sample, the low number of total searches does leave questions as to
if the results would be different had the period be extended.
Future Research
Future research of political comedy programming and intermedia agenda setting could
focus specifically on the correlation between a media clip becoming viral and the levels of news
coverage that follow. Additionally, more research must be done to further investigate the
differences between covering specific topics and issues associated with media content and
coverage of the political comedy product itself. In regards to future research regarding Last
Week Tonight and the so-called Oliver effect, there are multiple avenues of additional research
that may be compelling. Through searches of the news articles that featured John Oliver or Last
Week Tonight, we have some anecdotal evidence that suggests that outlets choose to cover the
show in many different ways. For example, Time’s coverage of the tobacco segment was varied
between entertainment coverage and health coverage, referencing both the show’s ‘takedown’
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of big tobacco in the entertainment article that shared the clip as well as embedding the clip in
a health article about plain cigarette packing studies, a specific aspect of the tobacco segment
that was discussed. The Washington Post’s coverage of the Last Week Tonight segment on
televangelism, where John Oliver creates his own church to exploit the tax-exempt status of
religious groups and aptly names it, “Our Lady of Perpetual Exemption,” was covered the day
after the segment aired in its local politics section, two days after the segment aired in the
Religion section, and a full week after in the local section with reference to the viewer response
to the segment. This suggests that both the type of article and the content of the story that
discusses the segment may hold significant importance to researchers, especially with
considerations to Jeongsub’s (2011) model for understanding intermedia responses. Another
worthy research endeavor would be to conduct a survey of journalists in efforts to determine if
the journalist’s viewing habits of Last Week Tonight or interest in the show’s humor may
influence their decisions to publish articles about the segments featured on the show. The
wealth of data possible from conducting in-depth interviews with journalists would not only
provide valuable information about their media habits and influences, but also provide valuable
insight toward understanding the mechanisms and pressures that mediate the intermedia
agenda-setting process in the digital age.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study seeks and finds moderate support for an agenda-setting effect
of the HBO show, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver on news coverage of the issues and topics
that serve as the show’s primary segments. An improvement of the traditional political comedy
program, Last Week Tonight is built to flourish in the online digital environment by offering
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premium content with no commercial breaks on the social media platform YouTube, where
segments are uploaded within 24 hours of airing and are free to view by anyone with an
Internet connection. Through an analysis of the most and least popular segments of the show,
results suggest that the level of news coverage surrounding the segment’s topics are greater
than in the comparable date ranges prior to the episode airing, which suggests some agendasetting effect. Despite the study’s limitations, this paper serves as the beginning of a larger
discussion regarding the effects of the Internet and digital media landscape on both political
comedy programming and intermedia agenda-setting processes.
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APPENDIX B: DETAILED SCORING INFORMATION
Top 10 Segments by YouTube Views
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Season
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2

Episode #
6
18
5
32
10
49
8
22
12
48

Air Date
6/8/2014
9/21/2014
6/1/2014
4/5/2015
8/1/2014
8/9/2015
6/22/2014
10/26/2014
7/27/2014
8/9/2015

YouTube Title
FIFA and the World Cup
Miss America Pageant
Net Neutrality
Government Surveillance
Wealth Gap
Televangelists
Dr. Oz and Nutritional Supplements
Sugar
Nuclear Weapons
Sex Education

YouTube Views
12305819
11048846
10645588
10190359
9656777
9385104
8672529
8520957
8316919
8266555

Bottom 10 Segments by YouTube Views (Reverse ordered)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Season
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1

Episode #
56
7
57
46
27
34
58
4
59
9

Air Date
11/1/2015
6/15/2014
11/8/2015
7/26/2015
2/22/2015
4/19/2015
11/15/2015
5/18/2014
11/22/2015
6/29/2014

YouTube Title
Medicaid Gap
The Washington Redskins
Prisoner Re-Entry
Mandatory Minimums
Elected Judges
Patents
Daily Fantasy Sports
Right to be forgotten
Pennies
Hobby Lobby
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YouTube Views
3017789
3091466
3475369
3672658
3743408
3819483
3856464
3947096
3973925
4049157

Top 10 Segments by YouTube Shares
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Season
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2

Episode #
49
6
55
32
5
48
52
45
36
26

Air Date
8/9/2015
6/8/2014
10/18/2015
4/5/2015
6/1/2014
8/9/2015
9/27/2015
7/19/2015
5/3/2015
2/15/2015

YouTube Title
Televangelists
FIFA and the World Cup
Canadian Election
Government Surveillance
Net Neutrality
Sex Education
Migrants and Refugees
Food Waste
Standardized Testing
Tobacco

YouTube Shares
87589
55069
54062
53703
47665
42765
40346
37750
33583
31491

Bottom 10 Segments by YouTube Shares (Reverse ordered)
Rank
1
2
3
4

Season
1
1
1
1

Episode #
4
7
9
9

Air Date
5/18/2014
6/15/2014
6/29/2014
6/29/2014

5
6
7
8
9
10

1
2
1
2
2
2

2
27
23
34
59
57

5/4/2014
2/22/2015
11/2/2014
4/19/2015
11/22/2015
11/8/2015

YouTube Title
Right to be Forgotten
The Washington Redskins
Hobby Lobby
Uganda and Pepe Julian Onziema
Pt. 1
Death Penalty
Elected Judges
State Legislatures
Patents
Pennies
Prisoner Re-Entry
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YouTube Shares
1745
1803
3286
4404
5374
5596
6276
6613
6763
7240

Top 10 Segments by YouTube Subscriptions Driven
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Season
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Episode #
6
5
2
18
12
10
8

Air Date
6/8/2014
6/1/2014
5/4/2014
9/21/2014
7/27/2014
8/1/2014
6/22/2014

8
9
10

2
1
1

32
11
17

4/5/2015
7/20/2014
9/14/2014

YouTube Title
FIFA and the World Cup
Net Neutrality
Death Penalty
Miss America Pageant
Nuclear Weapons
Wealth Gap
Dr. Oz and Nutritional
Supplements
Government Surveillance
Prison
Scottish Independence

YouTube Sub Driven
42214
41334
26683
20736
19187
18773
18580
18380
16469
16297

Bottom 10 Segments by YouTube Subscriptions Driven (Reverse ordered)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Season
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Episode #
56
57
7
59
54
58
47
37
51
33

Air Date
11/1/2015
11/8/2015
6/15/2014
11/22/2015
10/11/2015
11/15/2015
8/2/2015
5/10/2015
9/13/2015
4/12/2015

YouTube Title
Medicaid Gap
Prisoner Re-Entry
The Washington Redskins
Pennies
North Dakota
Daily Fantasy Sports
Washington D.C. Statehood
Paid Family Leave
Public Defenders
The IRS
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YouTube Sub Driven
2032
2085
2366
2638
2855
3157
3271
3331
3382
3407

Top 10 Segments by YouTube Likes
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Season
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
2

Episode #
32
5
49
6
48
26
52
18
42
39

Air Date
4/5/2015
6/1/2014
8/9/2015
6/8/2014
8/9/2015
2/15/2015
9/27/2015
9/21/2014
6/21/2015
5/31/2015

YouTube Title
Government Surveillance
Net Neutrality
Televangelists
FIFA and the World Cup
Sex Education
Tobacco
Migrants and Refugees
Miss America Pageant
Online harassment
FIFA II

YouTube Likes
125908
124017
116226
104010
96915
96498
79002
75394
73218
69976

Bottom 10 Segments by YouTube Likes (Reverse ordered)
Rank
1
2
3
4

Season
1
1
1
1

Episode #
7
4
9
9

Air Date
6/15/2014
5/18/2014
6/29/2014
6/29/2014

5
6
7
8
9
10

1
2
2
2
2
2

23
56
27
34
54
33

11/2/2014
11/1/2015
2/22/2015
4/19/2015
10/11/2015
4/12/2015

YouTube Title
The Washington Redskins
Right to be forgotten
Hobby Lobby
Uganda and Pepe Julian Onziema
Pt. 1
State Legislatures
Medicaid Gap
Elected Judges
Patents
North Dakota
The IRS
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YouTube Likes
13691
22586
23540
28127
31285
33156
34011
35837
36941
37811

Top 10 Segments by YouTube Dislikes (Reverse Ordered) – Least Amount of Dislikes
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Season
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1

Episode #
4
34
27
21
13
25
23
40
9
7

Air Date
5/18/2014
4/19/2015
2/22/2015
10/19/2014
8/3/2014
2/8/2015
11/2/2014
6/7/2015
6/29/2014
6/15/2014

YouTube Title
Right to be forgotten
Patents
Elected Judges
Translators
Native Advertising
Marketing to Doctors
State Legislatures
Bail
Hobby Lobby
The Washington Redskins

YouTube Likes
316
520
574
665
682
812
819
868
870
886

YouTube Title
Online Harassment
Migrants and Refugees
Transgender Rights
Canadian Election
LGBT Discrimination
Sex Education
Wealth Gap
Ferguson
Government Surveillance
Televangelists

YouTube Likes
29635
22707
7609
4657
4377
3105
2663
2591
2336
2136

Bottom 10 Segments by YouTube Dislikes
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Season
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2

Episode #
42
52
43
55
50
48
10
15
32
49

Air Date
6/21/2015
9/27/2015
6/28/2015
10/18/2015
8/23/2015
8/9/2015
7/13/2014
8/17/2014
4/5/2015
8/9/2015
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Segments by Scoring (+1 point for a Top 10 ranking, -1 for a Bottom 10 ranking)
Top Scoring Segments (13 with 2 or more)
Rank
1
T-2
T-2
T-2
T-2
T-3
T-3
T-3
T-4
T-4
T-4
T-4
T-4

Season
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2

Episode #
32
5
6
48
49
10
18
52
8
12
26
42
55

Air Date
4/5/2015
6/1/2014
6/8/2014
8/9/2015
8/16/2015
7/13/2014
9/21/2014
9/27/2015
6/22/2014
7/27/2014
2/15/2015
6/21/2015
10/18/2015

YouTube Title
Government Surveillance
Net Neutrality
FIFA and the World Cup
Sex Education
Televangelists
Wealth Gap
Miss America Pageant
Migrants and Refugees
Dr. Oz and Nutritional Supplements
Nuclear Weapons
Tobacco
Online Harassment
Canadian Election

Score (5 max)
5
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2

Bottom 10 Segments Overall (Reverse Scored) (12 with -2 or more)
Rank
1
T-2
T-2
T-2
T-2
T-3
T-3
T-3
T-3
T-3
T-4
T-4

Season
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2

Episode #
7
4
9
27
34
23
33
56
57
59
54
58

Air Date
6/15/2014
5/18/2014
6/29/2014
2/22/2015
4/19/2015
11/2/2014
4/12/2015
11/1/2015
11/8/2015
11/22/2015
10/11/2015
11/15/2015

YouTube Title
The Washington Redskins
Right to be forgotten
Hobby Lobby
Elected Judges
Patents
State Legislatures
The IRS
Medicaid Gap
Prisoner Re-Entry
Pennies
North Dakota
Daily Fantasy Sports
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Score (-5 Max)
-5
-4
-4
-4
-4
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-2
-2

APPENDIX C: PEW TOP 50 ONLINE NEWS ENTITIES
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APPENDIX D: CONSTRUCTED SAMPLE OF NEWS OUTLETS

Outlet
Code

Outlet Name

Link

1 Time

time.com

2 NPR

npr.com

Notes

Included
in
Sample?
YES
YES

Cannot see large results, limit
to 10 pages

3 CNN

cnn.com

4 Los Angeles Times

latimes.com

YES

5 Washington Post

washingtonpost.com

YES

6 The Houston Chronicle

chron.com

YES

7 Boston Globe

bostonglobe.com

Limited to 10 pages of returns

YES

8 NBC News

nbcnews.com

YES

9 Examiner

examiner.com

Limited to 5 pages of returns
Limited to 10 pages of returns,
no sorting

10 Vice

vice.com

Limited to 10 pages of returns

YES

11 Huffington Post

huffingtonpost.com

No search function

NO

21 New York Times

nytimes.com

YES

12 Buzzfeed

buzzfeed.com

YES

13 Elite Daily

elitedaily.com

14 Mashable

mashable.com

15 Upworthy

upworthy.com

16 Gawker

gawker.com

17 Vox

vox.com

Limited to 8 results per search
Does not return accurate
results, no sorting

YES

NO

NO
NO
YES

Cannot see large results, limit
to 10 pages

YES
YES

18 The Daily Beast

the dailybeast.com

19 Salon

salon.com

No articles after 2013 in search
results
Does not return accurate
results, no sorting

20 Mic

mic.com

No search function
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NO
NO
NO

APPENDIX E: VARIABLES, OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS, SOURCES, STATISTICS, AND DATA
Variable
YouTube
Title/Keyword
News Outlet Code

Traditional or
Native Online
News Source

Counts of news
coverage

Extended counts
of news coverage

Counts of news
coverage with
additional
keywords

Operational
Definition
The main subject of
each segment
The corresponding
code to the news
outlet searched
Whether or not the
news outlet is a
traditional online
news source or a
native online news
source
Number of results of
keyword searches
both 3 days before
and 3 days following
the air date (V3)

Number of results of
keyword searches
both 7 days before
and 7 days following
the air date (V3)

Number of results of
keyword searches
with additional
keywords both 3
days and 7 days
after following the
air date (V3)

Source

Statistics

Data

YouTube
descriptions,
segment video
List of constructed
sample of news
outlets
Internet lookup of
all news sources
sampled

N/A

V4

N/A

V5

N/A

V7

News outlets in
sample

Pre-Count
Range: 0-21
Mean: .91
Std Dev: 2.494

V7 (Pre-Count)
and V9 (PostCount)

News outlets in
sample

News outlets in
sample

Post-Count
Range: 0-85
Mean: 2.75
Std Dev: 7.602
Extended PreCount
Range: 0-57
Mean: 2.54
Std Dev 6.579
Extended PostCount
Range: 0-115
Mean: 4.22
Std Dev: 12.354
Post-Count
Additional
Range: 0-4
Mean: .39
Std Dev: .701
Extended PostCount Additional
Range: 0-5
Mean: .42
Std Dev: .044

58

V 8 (Extended
Pre-Count)
and V10
(Extended
Post-Count)

V11 (PostCount
Additional
Keywords) and
V12 (Extended
Post-Count
Additional
Keywords)

APPENDIX F: INTERCODER RELIABILITY CODEBOOK AND DATASET
Codebook 1 for Intercoder Reliability: Keyword Searches for News Coverage Counts
This codebook includes instructions for Codebook 1, which will require the coder to run specified
keyword searches on the websites of news outlets for the purposes of establishing intercoder reliability.
Each set of keywords reflect the major topics, events, or key identifying details featured as the main
segment on episodes of the HBO comedy show, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver.
The goal of these searches is to determine if evidence exists of any potential agenda setting effect on
news coverage as a result of segments produced by the show. For this reason, six searches will be
performed for each set of keywords: one search of news coverage 3 days prior to the episode date (precount), a search of news coverage 7 days prior to the episode date (extended pre-count), a search of
news coverage 3 days following the episode date (post-count), a search of news coverage 7 days
following the episode date (extended post-count), and two searches of the post-count and extended
post-count period with the additional keywords of, “John Oliver” and, “Last Week Tonight”. In this study,
only news articles from 2014 and 2015 will be analyzed as part of the sample.
Results from these searches will be documented into the Excel spreadsheet by episode, not by individual
search. For the purposes of establishing intercoder reliability, the sample is comprised of 2 selected
keywords, which require 40 sets of searches each, a pre and post-count search on each news outlet’s
website.
The researcher will provide a detailed companion spreadsheet that includes the necessary segment and
air date information. In addition, the researcher will provide a list of news outlets that correspond to the
news outlet codes. Each site possesses their own systems for searching content, so notes will be
provided if necessary to any differences or idiosyncrasies between sites.

Coder ID: Input the Coder ID Number for each Facebook profile analyzed (Andrew=1, Other=2) [CID]
For each row, ensure the following information is filled out:

1. Season Number: Enter the corresponding season number into the spreadsheet. [V1]
2. Episode Number: Enter the episode number the segment corresponds to. [V2]
3. Air Date: Enter the date the corresponding episode aired. (example: 11/02/2015) [V3]
4. YouTube Title (Keyword): Enter the title of the segment as indicated by the corresponding
spreadsheet. [V4]
5. News Outlet Code: Enter the corresponding news outlet code as indicated by the corresponding
list. [V5]
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Procedures
First, open the webpage of the news outlet [V5] you will search:
1. When on the website, locate the search function, box, or link. Generally this is in the form of a
small magnifying glass icon somewhere near the top of the page.
2. Enter the keyword [V4] into the search box and press enter.
NOTE: Please refer to the notes on the list of websites for detailed information on how to
perform searches on specific websites. In some cases, advanced searches may not be possible
and the results will have to be manually sorted by date.
3. Determine the date of the searches based on the Air Date [V3].
4. Locate or count the number of search results within the specified time frame.
NOTE: On some webpages, advanced search options may be available that allow you to
narrow the returns. Otherwise, this will have to be done manually.
5. This study requires the coder to record results from two different time frames: three days
before (pre-count) and after (post-count) each air date, as well as seven days before (pre-count)
and after (post-count) each air date. This can either be done manually as noted previously or by
altering the search terms in the advanced search functions.
6. Input the number of results into the appropriate Pre-Count or Post-Count column. For the
purposes of this study, use columns [V6 through V11] to record counts.
7. Move to the next row and news outlet website and repeat searches for each date range and sets
of keywords until each column is completed.
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APPENDIX G: STUDY CODEBOOK AND DATASET
Codebook 1 for Code Sheet 1: Keyword Searches for News Coverage Counts

This codebook includes instructions for code sheet 1, which will require the coder to run specified
keyword searches on 14 different websites of various online news outlets. Each set of keywords reflect
the major topics, events, or key identifying details featured as the main segment on episodes of the HBO
comedy show, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver.

The goal of these searches is to determine if evidence exists of any potential agenda setting effect on
news coverage as a result of segments produced by the show. For this reason, six searches will be
performed for each set of keywords: one search of news coverage 3 days prior to the episode date (precount), a search of news coverage 7 days prior to the episode date (extended pre-count), a search of
news coverage 3 days following the episode date (post-count), a search of news coverage 7 days
following the episode date (extended post-count), and two searches of the post-count and extended
post-count period with the additional keywords of, “John Oliver” and, “Last Week Tonight”. In this study,
only news articles from 2014 and 2015 will be analyzed as part of the sample.

Results from these searches will be documented into the Excel spreadsheet by episode, not by individual
search. For the purposes of this study, the sample is comprised of 25 selected keywords that correspond
to an episode segment. Since there are six counts per segment and 14 total news sources, there will be
350 rows of data and 2,100 counts.

The researcher will provide a detailed companion spreadsheet that includes relevant information for
each segment to be analyzed in the study. Consult this spreadsheet when filling out items 1-6. In
addition to the spreadsheet, a list of news outlet websites will be provided to detail the constructed
sample of news outlets where the searches will occur. Each site possesses their own systems for
searching content, so notes will be provided if necessary to any differences or idiosyncrasies between
sites.

Coder ID: Input the Coder ID Number for each Facebook profile analyzed (Andrew=1, Other=2) [CID]

For each segment (documented in each row), first document the following information:

6. Season Number: Enter the corresponding season number into the spreadsheet. [V1]
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7. Episode Number: Enter the episode number the segment corresponds to. [V2]
8. Air Date: Enter the date the corresponding episode aired. (example: 11/02/2015) [V3]
9. YouTube Title (Keyword): Enter the title of the segment as indicated by the corresponding
spreadsheet. [V4]
NOTE: If the keyword contains more than one word, use quotations to ensure the search returns
contain both words together.
Procedures
First, open the webpage of the news outlet [V5] you will search:
1. When on the website, locate the search function, box, or link. Generally this is in the form of a
small magnifying glass icon somewhere near the top of the page.
2. Enter the keyword [V4] into the search box and press enter.
NOTE: Please refer to the notes on the list of websites for detailed information on how to
perform searches on specific websites. In some cases, advanced searches may not be possible
and the results will have to be manually sorted by date.
3. Determine the date of the searches based on the attached date chart.
4. Locate or count the number of search results within the specified time frame.
NOTE: On some webpages, advanced search options may be available that allow you to
narrow the returns. Otherwise, this will have to be done manually. If the coder is unable to
use the site to achieve an accurate count due to the inability to find search results, they will
code 999 in the corresponding cells.
5. Input the number of results into the appropriate Pre-Count or Post-Count column. For the
purposes of this study, use columns [V7 through V12] to record counts.
6. Move to the next row and news outlet website and repeat searches for each date range and sets
of keywords until each column is completed.

63

Air Date

Pre-Count Period
(Friday, Saturday,
Sunday before air)

Extended Pre-Count
Period (7 days before air
date to air date)

Post-Count Period
(Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday after air)

Extended Post-Count
Period (Monday until
7 days after air date)

4/5/2015

April 3rd – 5th

March 29th – April 5th

April 6th – 8th

April 6th -12th

6/1/2014

May 30th – June 1st

May 25th – June 1st

June 2nd – 4th

June 2nd – 8th

6/8/2014

June 6th – 8th

June 1st – 8th

June 9th – 11th

June 9th – 15th

8/9/2015

August 7th – 9th

August 2nd – 9th

August 10th – 12th

August 10th – 16th

8/16/2015

August 14th – 16th

August 9th – 16th

August 17th – 19th

August 17th – 23rd

7/13/2014

July 11th – 13th

July 6th – 13th

July 14th – 16th

July 14th – 20th

9/21/2014

September 19th – 21st

September 14th – 21st

September 22nd – 24th

September 22nd – 28th

9/27/2015

September 25th – 27th

September 20th -27th

September 28th – 30th

September 28th –
October 4th

6/22/2014

June 20th – 22nd

June 15th – 22nd

June 23rd – 25th

June 23rd – 29th

7/27/2014

July 25th – 27th

July 20th – 27th

July 28th – 30th

July 28th – August 3rd

2/15/2015

February 13th – 15th

February 8th – 15th

February 16th – 19th

February 16th – 22nd

6/21/2015

June 19th – 21st

June 14th – 21st

June 22nd – 24th

June 22nd – 28th
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10/18/2015

October 16th -18th

October 11th – 18th

October 19th – 21st

October 19th – 25th

6/15/2014

June 13th – 15th

June 8th – 15th

June 16th – 18th

June 16th – 22nd

5/18/2014

May 16th – 18th

May 11th – 18th

May 19th – 21st

May 19th – 25th

6/29/2014

June 27th – 29th

June 22nd – 29th

June 30th – July 2nd

June 30th – July 6th

2/22/2015

February 20th – 22nd

February 15th – 22nd

February 23rd – 25th

February 23rd – March
1st

4/19/2015

April 17th – 19th

April 12th – 19th

April 20th – 22nd

April 20th – 26th

11/2/2014

October 31st –
November 2nd

October 26th –
November 2nd

November 3rd – 5th

November 3rd- 9th

4/12/2015

April 10th – 12th

April 5th – 12th

April 13th -15th

April 13th – 19th

11/1/2015

October 30th –
November 1st

October 25th –
November 1st

November 2nd – 4th

November 2nd -8th

11/8/2015

November 6th – 8th

November 1st – 8th

November 9th – 11th

November 9th – 15th

11/22/2015

November 20th – 22nd

November 15th – 22nd

November 23rd – 25th

November 23rd – 29th

10/11/2015

October 9th – 11th

October 4th – 11th

October 12th – 14th

October 12th – 18th

11/15/2015

November 13th – 15th

November 8th – 15th

November 16th – 18th

November 16th – 22nd
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